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The recent resurgence of populism poses a significant challenge to constitutional law 
today and to the deeper tradition of modern constitutionalism. Despite resisting formal 
limitations on their power to represent the ‘true’ popular will, populist regimes 
nevertheless find instrumental and ideological reasons to endorse their own version of 
constitutionalism. And despite their nativist commitments, populist leaders across the 
globe find common constitutional cause and mutual encouragement in their critique of 
cosmopolitan institutions and values. The distinctiveness of populism’s constitutional 
orientation rests on its occupation of a space between authoritarian and popular versions 
of constitutionalism, overlapping both but not reducible to either. There situated, 
populism involves a reaction against what it condemns as the neglect of the unitary 
collective particular in the liberal version of modern constitutionalism. Many critical 
of the inflated narratives and methods of populism nevertheless share some its 
underlying anxieties. For in an age in which an expanding commitment to the 
democratic pedigree of our constitutional arrangements has unfolded alongside  the 
increasing transnationalisation and fragmentation of political authority,  the  very 
instability of the balance between various constitutional  goods - between individualism 
and collectivism, universal and particular rationalities,  and plurality and unity –  that 
fuels populists’ ire, deepens the defining tension of modern constitutionalism and poses 





1. The Populist Vogue 
 
The latest intellectual fashions in making sense of polity and society, like the latest 
fashions in any area of life, often both reveal and distort. They are revealing in that any 




instructive both about the object to be accounted for and about the subjects doing the 
accounting. By examining academic trends, we gain insight not only into how and why 
things change in the world, but also into how and why we might develop common 
preoccupations in making sense of how and why things change. Equally, however, 
fashions can be distorting, as they typically involve a self-reinforcing inflation. The 
new fashion become ever more fashionable just because it is already fashionable.   
The idea of ‘populism’ is intensely fashionable, and like most intensely 
fashionable things, its meaning is in a constant state of evolution and contestation. Over 
the last decade or so, however, an ‘ideational approach’1 that treats populism as a 
discourse and worldview has become increasingly influential. It has overshadowed but 
also largely subsumed earlier approaches focusing variously on the nurturing of a deep 
culture of popular engagement in politics,2 on governmental regimes whose broad 
appeal is based on a strongly interventionist and redistributive programme fueled by 
sustained deficit financing, or on a charismatic or demotic style of political leadership.3 
Jan Werner Muller deftly captures the common or overlapping core of this new 
approach when he describes populism as ‘a particular moralistic imagination of politics, 
a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and unified - 
but…ultimately fictional - people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some 
other way morally inferior’.4  It follows that ‘populist constitutionalism’, to the extent 
that this  is at all a coherent notion,5  should refer to  a type of constitutional practice or 
discourse that pursues, defends or encourages just that kind of moralistic imagination 
                                                        
1 CASS MUDDE &  CRISTOBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 5 (2017)  
2  See e.g. ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON (2005) 
3 Mudde & Kaltwasser, above n1, 2-5. 
4 JAN-WERNER MULLER, WHAT IS POPULISM?  19-20 (2016) 




of politics as involving a binary opposition between ‘two homogenous and antagonistic 
camps.’6   
Armed with this capsule definition, we can appreciate how the general truth 
about the revelatory and distortive qualities of fashion applies with special emphasis to 
the case of ‘populism’, and to its constitutional offshoot.  Populism, like  other central 
terms in our political vocabulary such as ‘sovereignty’ or even ‘constitutionalism’ 
itself, possesses a double signification. It registers not only in our analytical ‘meta 
language’ but also in our political ‘object language’. 7   If populism, as Muller’s 
definition suggests, should be understood  as one contemporary expression of our 
political imaginary – a way of thinking about and framing  the political world that is 
current within the political world itself, then the use of the term ‘populist’ (and its 
proxies) is the very object or thing, or at least one part of the thing, that  we are studying 
in the political domain -  nowhere more intensely than in the news and social media 
discourse that surrounds and bleeds into the political domain.  Certainly, this is not to 
downplay populism’s analytical credentials – as also supplying the tool with which we 
explain the very  thing  we are studying.  Populism, as already noted, is a term that 
boasts a considerable academic pedigree as a meta-concept – one that significantly 
predates the current political wave. 8  But its contemporary invocation in academic 
discourse – especially in the legal academy with little by way of a distinct populism-in-
law pedigree - has undoubtedly been stimulated by the recent elevation of its political 
profile.  The latest academic fashion in naming and framing populism has tracked the 
political fashion in naming and framing populism. And in so doing, the unavoidable 
                                                        
6 Mudde & Kaltwasser, above n1,  
7 On the application of this approach to the idea of sovereignty; see Neil Walker, ‘Late sovereignty 
in the European Union’ in NEIL WALKER (ed) SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 3-32 (2003)   
8  See e.g. CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, PAUL A. TAGGART, PAULINA OCHOA 




spillage of meaning between the object level and the meta level – between engaged 
claim and detached understanding - that occurs in the case of all such two-level political 
concepts, and the consequent difficulty of the latter retaining critical distance from the 
former, is reinforced on account of  the unusual intensity and volatility we have come 
to associate with this particular current political fashion.9   
That intensity becomes clear from the most cursory glance at the political 
landscape. A search for ‘populism’ and ‘constitution’ in the same internet sentence  in 
any month since the beginning of 2017, for example, would take the investigator to a 
diverse range and ever expanding cast of figures and movements -  from Donald Trump, 
to  Vladimir Putin, then to Nigel Farage, and increasingly, to Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, 
to Emmanuel Macron in France, to Victor Orban in Hungary, to Recep Erdogan in 
Turkey, to Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, to Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, to 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s shadow leadership in Poland;  not to mention all the ‘wannabees’, 
from France’s Le Pen and Mélenchon and Holland’s Wilders to Italy’s  Beppe Grillo 
and the shifting cast of leaders of Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), 
Austria’s Freedom Party, Finland’s True Finns, Spain’s Podemos, and even some  
leaders of sub-state nationalist movements in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, Lombardia 
and elsewhere.    Academic interest, already primed in response to events such as the 
Arab Spring,10 the longer trail of Central and Eastern Europe’s uneven post-Communist 
                                                        
9  A particular manifestation of this problem is the increased tendency at the everyday ‘object 
level’ for the populist label to be applied pejoratively to others rather than self-ascribed as a 
badge of pride; see Mudde & Kaltwasser, above n1, 2.   
10 See e.g. NIMER SULTANEY, LAW AND REVOLUTION: LEGITIMACY AND 




transformation,11experiments in South American presidentialism,12 and new forms of 
electoral authoritarianism in Asia,13 has moved quickly to bring within the same wide 
contemplative frame these fresh outbreaks of populism from around the globe and 
across the Left/Right political spectrum.14  In all this, however, the academic agenda is 
reactive rather than proactive. It is constantly being shaped and reshaped by political 
developments – playing a seemingly endless game of explanatory ‘catch up’ with 
events on the ground. 
The twin possibilities of revelation and distortion, then, are thrown into 
particularly stark relief in the case of populism, and this indicates two opposite dangers 
to be avoided. On the one hand, against fashion’s propensity to distortion and 
overindulgence, we should not overstate the importance of the new category. To the 
extent that  ‘populist constitutionalism’ might supply a distinction that allows us fresh 
insight into the condition of the world, its contribution is surely to supplement rather 
than supplant our existing explanatory language and typological schemes. Populism 
may offer a relatively novel category of explanation and make a particularly urgent 
claim to relevance, but the seductive thrill of the new (or, at least, the newly recycled) 
should not lead us to mistake it for the master category. There are likely to remain 
various other important distinctions of constitutional type both within and beyond the 
                                                        
11 See e.g. WOJCIECH SADURSKI RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE (2nd ed. 2014)  
12 See e.g. Kathryn Hochstetler, ‘Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential Falls in 
South America’ 38 COMPARATIVE POLITICS,  401-418 (2006) 
13 See e.g. Grigorii Golosov ‘Lipstick on a crocodile: electoral authoritarianism in Central Asia’. 
 OPEN DEMOCRACY (2011); available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/grigorii-
golosov/lipstick-on-crocodile-electoral-authoritarianism-in-central-asia 
 
14 See e.g.  Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Populism , its opposites, and its contentious relationship 






category of populist constitutionalism. These older understandings should not be 
eclipsed by the new. Indeed, some more venerable distinctions will remain more 
fundamental, and, importantly, so also prerequisite to a proper appreciation of the new 
categorical distinction.   
On the other hand, we should not be dismissive of the new. We should not make 
the reverse mistake of assuming that inflation renders the idea of populism and populist 
constitutionalism empty of content and meaning. If, through the immodesty of fashion,  
populism proclaims a presence in every nook and cranny of our global political 
architecture, then its currency becomes worthless. If populism is everywhere, then it is 
effectively nowhere, a superficial constant rather than a discerning variable. Yet to 
assume that conceptual bankruptcy is populism’s inevitable fate would be an over-
reaction to the danger of distortion.  The preoccupation with populism, insofar as it 
reflects certain regularities of thought and expression, and of the framing effects of 
these regularities, can reveal something about what is happening in the world. We 
should not dismiss the new populist vogue, and its application to constitutional events 
and processes, as nothing more than a trendy labelling for dissimilar and unassociated 
events and regimes, since the very fact of its widespread invocation by those at the 
centre of these events and regimes suggests that it speaks, in however unrefined a 
manner, to something importantly ‘in common’ in the development of the 
contemporary political world. 
What is more, like any intellectual fashion, our common fascination with   
populism – to repeat – is worthy of investigation in its own right. For our very  
preoccupation with this particular way of understanding the social and political world 
may also tell us something of additional importance about the concerns that we hold in 





2. Populism in the Modern Constitutional Tradition 
 
With these guiding thoughts to the fore, I want to argue that both the development of 
populism as an important strain of our political and constitutional imaginary, and the 
analyst’s preoccupation with this trend, have to do with the relationship of populism to 
an underlying tension within the long tradition of modern constitutionalism. Populism 
is neither a surface distraction from other deeper trends, nor is it wholly anomalous 
within our political tradition - an aberrant or extraordinary departure from modern 
constitutionally embedded politics. Rather it can be seen as a product of and response 
to a series of stress factors that are intrinsic to the modern constitutional condition. And 
however we might judge the appropriateness of the  populist response, our very 
attentiveness to that response betrays a wider concern with the underlying tension in 
question, and an awareness that populism exposes modern constitutional method to 
searching questions to which there are no easy answers.  
This argument will be developed through the elaboration of a number of 
propositions: 
First, that the constitutional dimension of populism’s engagement, contrary to certain 
expectations, is one of its central features. 
Secondly, that populist constitutionalism, again contrary to certain expectations, 
encourages and is encouraged by a negative transnational solidarity – an affinity born 
of the construction of a generic common enemy, and notwithstanding the particularity 




Thirdly, that populist constitutionalism operates in a space which overlaps authoritarian 
and popular constitutionalism, and stands in a complex relationship to both – the terms 
of which allow us to identify important variations on the populist type 
Fourthly and, supplying a deepest and unifying tier of explanation, that populist 
constitutionalism, like the popular and authoritarian forms of constitutionalism from 
which it draws, involves a reaction against what its proponents view as the  neglect of 
the unitary collective particular in influential strands of modern constitutionalism. 
Many  critical of populist constitutionalism nevertheless share a sense that an unstable 
balance between various antinomic goods – an instability that feeds the reactionary 
narrative of the populists - supplies the defining tension of modern constitutionalism    
 
 
(a) The Centrality of the Constitutional  Dimension 
 
If the focus of populism is on an undifferentiated people as the ultimate reference point 
of political morality and source of authority, we might surmise that such a perspective 
can at best only allow a secondary place for constitutionalism’s independent reference 
point of positive morality and its claim as to the ultimate authority of law. In other 
words, as populism ‘entails a strong preference for the rule of men over the rule of 
law’15, perhaps we should not expect constitutional law to figure prominently on the 
populist playlist. Yet that would be too quick a conclusion.  Matters constitutional are, 
in fact, closely attended to by populists. And while, as Paul Blokker has argued, much 
of that attention is negative, a kind of ‘legal resentment’16 against existing structures of 
                                                        
15 Luigi Corrias , ‘Populism in a  Constitutional Key: Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty and 
Constitutional identity’  12 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 6-26, 10(2012) 




constitutional democracy, as he also insists, this is not the whole story. Rather, the 
populist attitude towards constitutionalism involves a wide-ranging ambivalence, and 
can be seen as comprising three elements – critical, instrumental and expressive. As we 
shall explore later, 17  beyond an immediate impulse to escape the shackles of any 
independent normative authority, populists find themselves out of sympathy with 
deeper features of the modern constitutional inheritance, but that does not deter them 
from a high level of engagement with the ‘here and now’ of constitutional politics.   
To begin with, the critical attitude channels resentment against the 
constitutional status quo ante. The focus of critique may be the elites – ‘the enemies of 
the people’. One obvious elite target is the judges, as the legal specialists who occupy 
the commanding heights of the system of constitutional interpretation and adjudication. 
But critique may also be levelled against the broader ‘Establishment’18 of constitutional 
roles and institutions of a political or administrative nature that mediates the 
relationship between ‘the people’ and political power. Or it may be against a ‘deep 
state’19 of clandestine power, of shadow elites – political, military and economic -  that 
stands behind and both sustains and is enabled by the formal constitutional framework. 
Resentment can also be more diffuse, targeted against the constitutional framework as 
a whole. Populist scepticism towards all forms of intermediation between power and 
their conception of a pure and unified popular will can often register as hostility before 
                                                        
  http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/05/populist-constitutionalism/. See also his ‘The Imaginary 
Constitution of Constitutions’  3 SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 1 (2017) 
17 See section 2(d) below. 
18 See e.g. Jonathan Matthew Smucker, ‘The Establishment is Not a Viable Candidate, NEW 
INTERNATIONALIST (2017); available at https://newint.org/features/2017/04/01/the-
establishment-is-not-a-viable-candidate 






structures and rules that provide for individual protections against collective power or  
the pluralist distribution of that collective power against its unitary articulation.20  
Populist ambivalence towards constitutionalism is sharply reflected in the 
approach that populists  take towards the constitution once in power. The attitude of 
critique towards the constraints upon popular power imposed by the constitution and 
towards the supposedly vested interests who work to sustain these constraints remains. 
Open hostility may in some measure give way to suspicion and frustration, but there is 
a significant sense in which, at the level of symbolic politics, populist governments 
affect  to govern against the state, including its inherited constitutional edifice.  Yet the 
attitudes of suspicion and frustration, and their public display, also fuel attempts to 
instrumentalise the constitution in the service of the new populist regime. 
There are two different approaches to this instrumentalisation, although these 
are typically complementary and also shade into one another. On the one hand, there is 
the strategy of circumvention, of working round or outside of constitutional norms in 
the conduct of government. On the other hand, there is the strategy of commandeering, 
of gaining control of the means to shape the normative framework of the constitution 
itself.  Strategies of circumvention include ruling by executive decree,21 packing or 
disempowering legislatures, ignoring judgments, influencing the electoral commission, 
denial of freedom of information, partisan exploitation of media ownership rules, use 
                                                        
20 On populism’s critique of pluralism, see e.g. Kaltwasser, above n14  
21  See, e.g., The Trump Presidency’s early use of executive orders instead of legislative initiative 
in  matters as diverse as immigration  control, the ban of trans-sexuals in the armed forces and 
the withdrawal of financial support for the Affordable Care Act; ‘Trump is On Pace To Sign More 
Executive Orders than any President in the past 50 Years, THE POINT )October 13, 2017); 





of emergency powers, and clientelism and cronyism in political and administrative 
appointments.22  
Commandeering, or what has elsewhere (and more judgmentally) been called 
‘abusive constitutionalism’23  is the more ambitious approach, and is more likely to 
occur where strategies of circumvention have failed or exhausted their potential. In 
functional terms, a constitution typically involves a ‘triple lock’ control of the political 
system. The first and most fundamental lock involves the entrenchment of the basic 
constitutional rules of the game against amendment or replacement, or at least a 
requirement of special majorities.  The second lock concerns the independence of the 
constitutional court or other apex courts in interpreting the constitution and the laws 
made under it. The third lock involves the basic ‘rule of law’ requirement that 
government be conducted according to  laws that have been duly passed under the 
widely-endorsed foundational constitutional pact  and interpreted by a judiciary 
insulated from executive or other partial interference. Whereas circumvention involves 
slipping the third lock and reverting to extra- or sub-constitutional means, 
commandeering involves either seizing the key to the first constitution-making lock, 
typically to devise a new constitutional scheme to consolidate executive power (as in 
                                                        
22  On the Slovenian example of circumvention, and its contrast with Hungary’s more 
commandeering approach,  see Bojan Bugaric,  ‘A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in post-
Communist Europe: ‘Lands in-between democracy and authoritarianism’ 13 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219-245 (2015). 




Hungary, 24 Turkey25 or Venezuela 26) or breaking the second lock in terms of the 
appointment, tenure and independent functioning of the apex courts (as in the recent 
Polish case27).  
The various instrumental strategies, those associated with commandeering in 
particular, also point towards what is of expressive value to populists in their 
engagement with constitutionalism. The populist taps into that part of the modern 
constitutional imaginary and its accompanying jurisgenerative method that speaks to 
the idea of popular sovereignty; concerned with the constituent power of the people and 
the constitutional text as the articulation of that  power and the purest crystallization of 
collective political will. Sometimes this is backward looking, involving a claimed 
recovery in the constitutional heritage of a broken promise of original collective intent; 
indeed, this is often a supportive side-commentary to a strategy of circumvention in the 
here and now – ‘We the people, lately but no longer to be thwarted’.  More often, 
however,  and sometimes in conjunction with a  nostalgic rhetoric  of recovery, the 
constitutive constitutional politics will be forward-looking, the replacement of 
constitutional text and refashioning of constitutional institutions pursued not just as a 
                                                        
24 Hungary Constitution of 2011; available at 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf; see also Bugaric, above n22; 
ANDREW ARATO,  POST-SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION MAKING: LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY, 
ch.4 (2016) 
25 A  procedurally disputed referendum took place in April 2017 and   approved eighteen 
amendments to the 1982 Constitution; see A. Acir, ‘The Constitutional Referendum in Turkey’ 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG  http://verfassungsblog.de/the-constitutional-referendum-in-turkey-a-far-
stretch-from-right-to-free-elections-to-referenda/ http://verfassungsblog.de/the-constitutional-
referendum-in-turkey-a-far-stretch-from-right-to-free-elections-to-referenda/; See also, Turku 
Isiksel, ‘Between Text and context: Turkey’s tradition of Authoritarian Constitutionalism’  11 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 702-726, 710  (2013) 
26 On President Maduro’s controversial decision in July 2017 to establish a constituent assembly 
to draft a new constitution, see ‘Venezuela’s getting a new constitution whether the people want 
it or not’ THE CONVERSATION; available at http://theconversation.com/venezuelas-getting-a-
new-constitution-whether-the-people-want-it-or-not-80242 
27 A new law significantly increasing party political influence over the appointment of senior 
judges was eventually passed in December 2017 after a two year struggle; see 





commandeering strategy but also in symbolic affirmation of the renewal of political 
unity.28  
That is why populists today tend to be supportive not just of large–scale 
constitutional change or regime succession, but also of all the paraphernalia of 
constitutional events and moments – including referendums, constituent assemblies and 
other ceremonies of endorsement. The populist constitutional solution really is of the 
moment in focus. The agenda of these demotic constitutional events is often 
‘partisan’. 29  They have  typically been pre-empted and prefixed by the populist 
insurgency, and a particular version of the constitutional expression of the popular will 
is pursued with such zeal, certainty and claim to unity that, even though it is also 
fundamental to the populist claim that they take ‘the people’ seriously  as a concrete 
socio-political entity against the artificially representative claims of elites, there is scant 
recognition of the dangers of freezing this particular expression of popular sovereignty 
against later reconsideration.  Yet, for all the latent tensions in their position, for the 
reasons given above many contemporary populists are increasingly comfortable in the 
public clothes of constitutional rectitude. 
(b) Populist Connections 
Interest in contemporary populism, and populist constitutionalism, has been reinforced 
by the scale and reach of its occurrence. Commentators note how widely populist 
politics have taken hold, and casually use words like ‘spread’30 to suggest a connection 
between its occurrence in one place and its appearance somewhere else. Yet, typically, 
                                                        
28  On these two sides of Trump’s populism, see , for example, Michael Kazin, ‘Trump and 
American populism’ 95 (6) Foreign Affairs (2016)  
29 Jan Werner Muller, ‘Populist Constitutions: A Contradiction in Terms’  VERFASSUNGSBLOG 
(2017) available at”  http://verfassungsblog.de/populist-constitutions-a-contradiction-in-terms/ 
30 See e.g. Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli, Tommaso Sonno ‘The spread of populism in 





little attention is paid to the factors and forces producing that spread. The focus tends 
to be more on what different instances of populism have in common, both in terms of 
superficial appearances and connections and through deep and shared structural roots,31  
than on how they influence each other – on affinity rather than mutual causality. The 
stress on affinity is reinforced by a preoccupation with the personalities of the leaders 
– one  encouraged by the charismatic self-projection of populist figureheads – and with 
their interpersonal relations. Implicit in all this is a sense that the strength of populism 
as a global movement is tied up with the chemistry of Trump-Farage, Trump –Putin, 
Putin –Erdogan, LePen-Wilders, Orban-Kacsynski etc.   
It is worth exploring, however, some of the less contingent supports across 
populist movements, and how these, too, connect to populism’s constitutional 
dimension. We might assume that populism would have little transnational resonance. 
After all, populism is always concerned with a particular populace and with certain core 
propensities plausibly attributable to that populace. It tends therefore, to be nativist in 
outlook, fronted by slogans such as ‘America First’ or ‘putting the Great back into 
Britain’. The ‘other’ against whom the authentic people is defined includes not only 
elites and self-identifying internal minorities who disturb the sense of a unified whole, 
but also migrants and foreign influences more generally, not least those taking 
institutional form as international organisations mandated to ‘interfere’ in national 
affairs.  
Yet while, for the most part, nativism offers fallow ground on which to build 
cross-border alliances, there are some fertile connecting channels. In the first place, 
nativists across national contexts might be opposed to the same types of internal or 
migrant minorities, and so find affinity, and even a sense of international or pan-
                                                        




regional identity, in the possession of certain racial or cultural attributes that distinguish 
them from these local minorities. Certain explicitly racist nativist movements, for 
example, increasingly assert and articulate a transnational solidarity in the name of a 
white Christian Europe.32 
 Secondly, and more broadly, opposition to forces that would deny the moral 
force of nativism is also a common thread across various strands of populism and 
provides the basis for a kind of negative solidarity. For nativist populists discover 
common cause against  a generic category of roles, interests, sensibilities and practices; 
namely what they view as a  cosmopolitanism – often itself  deemed to be associated 
with elite ‘frequent flyer’, ‘dotcom Web’, epistocratic or other privileged communities 
who enjoy high mobility and communicability - in which national particularity does not 
figure as an important value.33  
One particularly important unifying theme in this oppositional politics concerns 
the very notion of a disembedded universalism which, in the populist imaginary, is seen 
to underpin forces hostile to populism. And here the significance of legal and 
constitutional discourse again becomes clear. Nativist populists are hostile to all 
political values and interests that are ‘foreign’ to their peculiar conception of the 
national collective good, but they see a special and encompassing threat  in those alien 
political values and interests that wear the cloak of universalism in so doing. As law 
itself, through many of its historical forms and narratives of justification,34  is well 
                                                        
32  As demonstrated by the presence of right-wing nationalists from many European countries at 
Poland’s 2017  Independence Day celebrations; See Paul Hockenos,  ‘Poland and the 
Uncontrollable Fury Of Europe’s Far Right’ The Atlantic, November 17, 2017, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/europe-far-right-populist-nazi-
poland/524559/ 
33 On the significance of the nativist/cosmopolitan opposition within populist discourse, see 
Pierre Ostiguy, ‘Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach’ in KALTWASSER et al (eds) above n8, 
chapter 4. 
34 See e.g. JEREMY WALDRON, ‘PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND’: FOREIGN LAW IN 




adapted to the making of claims that transcend particular jurisdictions, so populists can 
often establish common cause against legal institutions that claim transnational 
normative force, as also against domestic legal institutions that recognize the legitimacy 
of such universally-coded claims of transnational validity. We find this, for example, 
in Trump and Putin’s selective hostility towards cosmopolitan institutions, in particular 
the United Nations. More broadly, the international human rights regime provides the 
clearest example of a form of legal-institutional mobilization set against the claims of 
domestic particularity, as such drawing the particular ire of populists. Take, for 
instance, the habit of ‘Strasbourg-bashing’35 which provides a common and cumulative 
thread amongst those who see the European Convention on Human Rights as a threat 
to native morality.  
The European Union, as a uniquely penetrative instance of contemporary 
transnational legal organization, has also been a special target of populist fire, and a 
particularly important context of transnational populist mobilization. When Poland’s 
Kaczynski and Hungary’s Orban joined forces in the autumn of 2016 to promise a 
‘cultural counter-revolution’ 36  in the EU, they were not merely acknowledging  
common opposition to the spectre of supranational encroachment on national 
sovereignty. They were also engaged in an exercise of mutual support and mobilization 
-  including collaboration in resisting the continuing threat of sanctions by the EU under 
their ‘rule of law’ compliance mechanism;37 and in treating the EU’s eventual decision 
to initiate formal proceedings as itself exemplary of cosmopolitan overreach.38 Or when 
                                                        
35 Barbara Oomen, ‘A Serious Case of Strasbourg-Bashing? 20 IJHR 407-425 (2016) 
36 See https://www.ft.com/content/e825f7f4-74a3-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a 
37 https://euobserver.com/institutional/137346  See Article 7, Treaty on European Union 
38 Dimitry Kochenov, Laurence Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele ‘The European Commission’s 






key Brexiteer, Nigel Farage, made links with other nationalist movements seeking exit 
referenda after the success of the British leave campaign in June 2016, he was not 
simply celebrating affinity but promising common cause against the pan-European 
polity.39   
 
(c) Between Authoritarian and Popular Constitutionalism  
 
Just as populism and its link with constitutional government has become a fashionable 
topic, so too, and somewhat earlier, there has been a renewal of interest in the 
connection between authoritarianism and constitutionalism.40 On one view, indeed, 
populist constitutionalism and authoritarian constitutionalism tend to collapse into one 
another. But while there is certainly a strong overlap, and we discover much about 
populism by examining how authoritarian regimes operate (and vice-versa), a simple 
equation of populism with authoritarianism is unduly reductive. In particular, it 
understates the ways in which populism also overlaps with popular constitutionalism. 
First, though, we examine the connection between populism and 
authoritarianism. Juan Linz's seminal analysis characterizes authoritarian political 
systems as possessing four key qualities.41 First, there is limited political pluralism. 
Authoritarian regimes place constraints on political institutions and agencies other than 
the key executive power holder as contributory sources of political influence – entities 
such as legislatures, political parties and interest groups. Secondly, authoritarian 
                                                        
39  See https://www.ft.com/content/3cef5b22-4ec0-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a 
40  See e.g. M.  Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism  100 Cornell Law Review 391, 397 (2015), 
David Law and Mila Versteeg, ‘Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism’ in TOM 
GINSBURG AND ALICE SIMPSER, CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 165-
198 (2013) 
41 Juan J. Linz, ‘Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes’, in NELSON POLSBY AND FRED 





regimes have a basis for legitimacy centred on emotional attachment. The authoritarian 
tendency of the regime is typically asserted as a necessity to combat or defend against 
ostensibly urgent societal problems, such as underdevelopment or insurgency. Thirdly, 
the scope for social mobilization in civil society is curtailed, typically through 
suppression of political opponents and anti-regime activity and aggressive or 
censorious attitudes towards oppositional media. And fourthly, authoritarianism 
enables informally defined executive authority, typically with vague and shifting 
powers.  
In short, in authoritarian regimes there is a tendency towards the monopoly of 
power rather than its distribution, towards the emotional over the rational and 
expediency over design, in favour of suppressing dissent rather than encouraging a 
culture of debate - with dissenters treated as enemies rather than adversaries, and 
towards expanding rather than fettering executive discretion. Against this, the most 
minimal definition of constitutionalism considered as a normative (rather than a purely 
descriptive) concept involves quite contrasting imperatives. 42  Modern 
constitutionalism typically seeks to diversify power and provide countervailing checks; 
to provide a rationally legible projection of government; to protect the right to oppose 
– speech, assembly, conscience, voting rights etc.; and to cabin rather than unleash 
discretion. 
                                                        
42  Constitutionalism as a ‘thick’ normative idea is best thought of as a multi-tiered concept that 
operates on more or less abstract planes. We consider the more abstract understanding in Section 2(d) 
below.   At the more concrete and less ideologically contentious extreme, constitutionalism is 
sometimes expressed instead in terms of a checklist of institutional accomplishments - judicial 
independence, free political parties, regular elections, basic freedom rights, separation of powers, inter-
institutional checks and balances. And between high principle and concrete institutional design there is 
an intermediate tier consisting of general juridical standards as applied to governmental forms. For 
example, for Isiksel, the essence of constitutionalism lies in its ‘precluding arbitrary, absolute or 
unaccountable forms of power’ (above n 25, 710) It is constitutionalism understood in terms of these 
relatively low levels of abstraction and contention that we are concerned with in the immediate 
discussion. For  discussion of the different levels of constitutionalism, see Jeremy Waldron, 
‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View, in JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICIAL 




Authoritarian constitutionalism, therefore, while it involves something less than 
a totalitarian or absolutist form of government, 43  nevertheless requires an uneasy 
reconciliation of contrasting tendencies. 44  This reconciliation takes quite different 
regime forms, and offers quite different trajectories.   David Law and Mila Verstag 
identify three types of constitutional regime with authoritarian tendencies.45 These are 
monarchical, military or, as the most common contemporary regime form, civilian – 
this last typically involving a dominant political party. All three variants (as well as 
their hybrid combinations) have mechanisms for monopolizing power and 
marginalizing opposition without involving the most egregious constitutional 
violations; such as ignoring term limits, cancelling elections, or usurping offices. In 
each case there is a modality and medium of power – army, family dynasty, party - that 
is cohesive and formidable, and which can secure both a sustainable internal order of 
government and the effective disempowerment of those outside the internal order. The 
constitutional strategy involved may be one of circumvention or commandeering, and 
typically is some combination of both. And in any case the general effect is to supply a 
                                                        
43 In contrast to authoritarianism, a totalitarian regime attempts to control virtually all aspects of social 
life, including economy, art, science and questions of private morality. North Korea offers a clear 
contemporary example. Certain other countries with dictatorships and authoritarian rule, such as 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Belarus, also display totalitarian tendencies. Other 
variations of authoritarianism, according to Tushnet (above n40) include, ‘absolute constitutionalism’ 
(415) (i.e. monarch with full powers, but must be exercised through law), and basic ‘rule of law 
constitutionalism’ (416) (requirements of generality, prospectivity, and other classical Rule of Law 
goods). For Tushnet, these types sit further towards the authoritarian end of the spectrum than 
authoritarian constitutionalism itself.  
 
44 For Mark Tushnet, ‘the problem is how to conceptualize regimes where elections are held, opponents 
sometimes elected to office, the dominant party pays some attention to public opinion, and dissent is 
allowed, but there is little or no danger that the regime will be replaced, where there are no effective 
restraints on policy decisions, and the level of dissent is controlled selectively.’ ‘Authoritarian 
Constitutionalism: some conceptual issues’ in Ginsberg and Simpser, above n40, 36-52.  Tushnet’s 
paradigm case is Singapore, but a longer list might include the following ‘electoral authoritarian’ 
regimes -  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Krygystan, Russia, Tajikistan, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia 
and Yemen, Burkina Fasso, Cameroon, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore 
(see Tushnet, above n40 (415) citing ANDREAS  SCHEDLER, THE LOGIC OF ELECTORAL 
AUTHORITARIANISM (2008) 




narrow circuit of power to displace or overcome the wider circuit of power we associate 
with a more inclusive and pluralistic constitutional discipline. 
If we turn from regime forms to trajectories of power, we can again discern 
three different patterns of development of authoritarian constitutionalism – which we 
might describe as embedded, reversionist and emergent. As the name suggests, 
embedded types of authoritarian constitutionalism enjoy long-term stability, and are 
often associated with military or monarchical regimes.  Reversionist types are those, 
such as Turkey and Hungary, where a more pluralistic system has been introduced 
against an authoritarian historical backdrop, but there is a tendency towards reversion 
or ‘backsliding’ 46 in accordance with the reassertion of party, military or dynastic 
power. Emergent types, finally, are those where there is authoritarian drift away from 
non-authoritarian beginnings; movement in an authoritarian direction through 
circumvention or commandeering of a constitution boasting a more pluralistic 
pedigree.47  
Clearly, populism and populist constitutionalism share many of the features of 
authoritarian constitutionalism.  The stress on a unitary framework of authority and 
political project  and the critique of pluralist structures, the emotionally charged  claim 
to provide the only authentic leadership, the delegitimization of opposition and the 
emphasis on executive discretion within and beyond the constitutional text,  all feature 
in the populist handbook as much as in the authoritarian handbook. Yet, as we have 
                                                        
46  See R. Dixon and D. Landau. ‘Tiered Constitutional Design’ 86 George Washington Law Review 
(2018)(forthcoming) 
47 There is terminological overlap but also a difference of emphasis between my reversionist-
emergent distinction and Huq and Ginsberg’s distinction between ‘authoritarian reversion’ and 
‘constitutional retrogression’. While their ‘constitutional retrogression’ type fits closely my 
‘emergent’ type , their ‘authoritarian reversion’ type differs from my ‘reversionist’ type in its 
primary focus  on output factors ( the rapid and near complete collapse of democratic 
institutions)  - rather than input factors ( the significance of the authoritarian tradition in 
enabling reversionist tendencies; A. Huq and T. Ginsberg, ‘How to Lose a Constitutional 




already seen in discussing populism’s rhetorical link to popular sovereignty, it is also 
an essential characteristic of populist constitutionalism, where it is not of authoritarian 
constitutionalism, to claim to speak for and in the name of the people; that people, 
moreover, are to be understood not simply as a juridical abstraction that enables their 
artificial representation, but as something ‘real’ or at least realizable - a concrete 
organic socio-political force.  
It is in  claiming as much that  populist constitutionalism necessarily but 
problematically  connects with a broader tradition of ‘popular constitutionalism’ – the 
idea that the people, considered as such a concrete socio-political force,  should not 
only supply the constituent power but should also assume ‘active and ongoing control 
over the interpretation and enforcement  of constitutional law’.48  The connection is 
necessary  because populism assumes the concrete people are an empirically continuous 
entity, and so should have their wishes taken account of beyond the constituent 
moment. But the connection is also problematic because even though the people are 
notionally considered in such concrete terms, the imagination of that people as a 
morally unified force that legitimates a morally dogmatic leadership in their name fails 
to entertain any genuine possibility of the people’s moral message being recognized as 
internally heterogeneous even when first issued, still less as having become diversified 
or significantly modified over time. 
This internally conflicted counter-attraction towards popular constitutionalism 
nonetheless complicates populism’s relationship to authoritarian constitutionalism. On 
the one hand, those forms of authoritarian constitutionalism that are deeply embedded 
                                                        
48  As famously defined by Larry Kramer “Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004,” 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 959, 959 (2004). See also his THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). Popular constitutionalism in an older 
European tradition has a more general resonance, focussing more on the foundational constituent 
power of the people.  See e.g. Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and the Constituent 




tend not to be populist.  Their claim to provide the only authentic leadership, typically 
backed up by military power and/or dynastic privilege, is largely independent of any 
claim to represent and respond to the people as a concrete entity, nor does it rest on a 
democratic conception of original constituent power.  On the other hand, the 
reversionist and emergent types do involve a populist approach, and their authoritarian 
trajectory can only be properly understood on account of that populist dimension.  
In the reversionist approach, the new clothes of plural constitutionalism tend to 
be discarded in the name of a rediscovery of the true essence of the people by a leader 
and political movement (often articulated through the creation of a new vanguard 
party). Perhaps this is done through a recovery or re-emphasis of a particular 
constitutional heritage associated with a regime characterized by a greater 
concentration of power, 49  and perhaps also, or alternatively, through a process of 
constitutional renewal that involves a reconcentration of power.50  In the emergent 
approach, the pluralist dimension within the constitution is recognized as a deeper and 
longer tradition, but also criticized as one that, supportive of and exploited by an elite 
establishment, is out of sympathy with the ‘real’ people. The (re)assertion of the 
interests of the populace is a trust assumed by the new populist leadership. It is a trust 
which, in the first instance at least, is likely to involve significant circumvention of the 
extant constitutional framework, but also with the prospect of a fuller commandeering 
and renewal. In either case, the populist moment contains an authoritarian impulse – a 
claim to renewed constitutional legitimacy in the name of a people and a popular project 
defined so as to ignore the plurality of popular sentiment and  deny or restrict the future 
means of that people to reflect upon and adjust that popular project. 
                                                        
49 On this aspect of the Turkish experience, see Isiksel, above n25. 




(d) Populism and Constitutional Tension 
One of the ways in which contemporary fascination with populism threatens to distort 
is by seducing us into thinking that populist approaches, and populist versions of 
constitutionalism, are somehow bound to prevail. That is not the case. Populism is 
inherently fragile and unstable. The limited circuits of authoritarian power to which it 
attaches itself – military, dynastic, vanguard party or movement, are precarious 
resources.  And where there is a more pluralist constitutional backdrop, even these 
resources may hardly be available. Additionally, populism may become trapped by its 
own contradictions. The repeated invocation of the people as a sacralized source of 
authority (the ‘real’ people) may disempower the people as a profane reality – (the real 
‘real’ people) in a way that undermines the legitimacy of the populist leadership. 
 Yet the fascination with populism, and the attraction of populist solutions, have 
deeper roots. We noted in the introduction that intellectual fashions reveal as much 
about the mindset of the analyst as about the object analysed. In the case of populism, 
it is arguable that the preoccupation of the analyst betrays a wider and more 
longstanding anxiety with the condition of modern constitutionalism. On this view, 
populism is a symptom of a more profound difficulty, one that is apt to recur as long as 
that difficulty persists 
 Contemporary populist constitutionalism – to recall - may be seen, and often 
presents itself, as a reaction against a certain type of constitutional orthodoxy. More 
specifically, it may be argued that both populism’s reference to a popular tradition and 
its pull towards authoritarianism respond to a perceived tendency towards the neglect 
of the unitary collective particular in our unfolding constitutional practice.  This is 
more obviously so with the popular element, as it embodies a claim to represent the 




authoritarian tradition more generally can also be seen as weighted towards 
representing what are claimed to be the interests of the polity as a whole against the 
undermining forces of excessive concern with individual interests or group pluralism.  
 This critique, in turn, resonates with a deeper series of stresses within the 
modern constitutional tradition. Earlier we discussed some relatively concrete ways of 
treating modern constitutionalism in normative terms, citing various institutional goods 
or juridical standards. 51  At a higher level of abstraction, however, modern 
constitutionalism as it crystallized from the late 18th century onwards embodies a more 
profound set of novel commitments. These are associated with the shift from a pre-
modern social imaginary where the very order of things, including the structure of 
human morality, was regarded as holistic and preordained, to one where  we understand 
ourselves as free and equal persons, individually and collectively capable of and 
entitled to make over the world in our own terms in the political communities of our 
choice. The realm of the political is one in which we organize these projects of self-
determination, and the constitution the device and discipline through which we do so. 
Yet the various founding impulses of political modernity, and the tensions amongst 
these impulses, run through and continue to inform and complicate that constitutional 
project. At the deepest level, constitutional method becomes one of affirmation and 
balancing of the different general values and principles – or goods - implicated in the 
pursuit of political self-determination. These goods may be presented as a series of 
contrasting – and in some respects opposing – pairs. And it is through an examination 
of these pairs - both their internal relationships and the relationships amongst them -   
that we appreciate how the populist critique feeds off and responds to instabilities 
within the deep structure of constitutionalism.  
                                                        




In particular, three contrasting pairs provide the deep context for the populist 
complaint about the neglect of the unitary collective particular. First, and most 
basically, there is the individual-collective distinction. As envisaged by the modern 
constitutional project, political society must simultaneously valorize the collective 
expression of its self-determination – the people acting in concert to make and sustain 
that political society for their mutual benefit - while also protecting the individual’s 
pursuit of her conception of the good from excessive collective encroachment.52  
Secondly, there is the universal-particular distinction. On the one hand, the 
premise of popular sovereignty is a universal one.53  The claim to a right to collective 
self-government is predicated upon notions of the equal worth of individual lives that 
in principle embrace each and every individual and community of individuals. So 
modern constitutional practice should track aspirations held in common across different 
collectivities, all drawing upon the same stock of principles of practical reason and 
institutional tools for their realization. On the other hand, in its community-specific 
focus, modern constitutional thought announces the distinctiveness of each 
constitutional entity in its historical origins and trajectory, institutional profile, political 
culture and community of attachment. The growing emphasis on democratic 
constitutionalism over the modern age – further explored below- both endorses and 
underlines this commitment to distinctive particularity. If the modern constitution is 
presented as an expression of popular sovereignty, and if its institutional provisions 
facilitate the democratic flourishing of its constituent community, then each 
                                                        
52  See further Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative 
Relationship,’ 39 RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE, 206-233 (2010); INTIMATIONS OF 
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constitution will perforce possess a distinctive pedigree and help nurture a distinctive 
political culture.54 
Thirdly, there is the distinction between plurality and unity – the many and the 
one. The fabric of modern political life is ‘communally pluralistic’. 55  As self-
determining individuals our basic common membership of the polity is embellished 
and qualified by various other forms of collective identity or association predicated 
upon shared material interests, ethnicity, language, culture, religion, gender and so on. 
And contemporary constitutional technology contains many mechanisms, from federal 
and other structures of limited self-government and general equality and anti-
discrimination clauses to the provision of distinctive group rights, designed to 
accommodate the diversity this brings.  Yet unity – or singularity - is also implicit in 
the very idea of a constitutional order. The thing ‘constituted’ becomes ‘joined up’ in 
the very process of its constitution. The body politic, like the human body, is an 
organism defined in terms of the integrity of the whole, and also, it follows, its 
separability from and independence of other organisms. A single and discrete people is 
matched to a single and discrete legal and political structure; indeed, the very logic of 
the operation of external sovereignty as a meta-principle in the global ‘Westphalian’ 
order of states has traditionally rested on a notion of the mutual recognition and mutual 
exclusivity of all such discrete units.56   
It is by running  these binary distinctions together that  we can identify a self-
reinforcing tension within modern constitutionalism between individualism, 
                                                        
54 See e.g. Dieter Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed 
world’ in PETRA DOBNER AND MARTIN LOUGHLIN (eds) THE TWILIGHT OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 3-22 (2010)  
55 MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFOOD, 
CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY 21(2009) 





universalism and plurality on the one side, and, on the other, the collectivism, 
particularism  and unitary structure  of whose neglect the populist complains.57 Indeed, 
the grievance of today’s populist can in one sense be construed as an amplified 
contribution to a familiar repetitive syndrome of constitutional action and reaction, 
protestation and redress, balance and counter-balance. For the reconciliation of these 
contrasting orientations has always been much contested in detail as in broader 
constitutional vision. It lies at the heart of historical disputes over the relationship 
between voice and rights, finality of legislation and judicial supremacy, the renewal of 
constituent power and the finality of constituted authority,  and even in some measure 
between gubernaculum (legal generation of governmental authority) and iurisdictio 
(legal restraint on governmental power).58  It is also implicated in questions over the 
relationship between constitutionalism as a culturally integrative or even assimilationist 
force and constitutionalism as an accommodation of multiple group identities.59   
 At the broader level of constitutional vision, the  most common and politically 
resonant of these ‘nested oppositions’60,  one that purports to absorb many of the others, 
                                                        
57 There are other contrasting pairs within the deep structure of constitutional modernity. The most 
fundamental juxtaposes autonomy with equality, the two founding anthropological assumptions of 
modern homo politicus. And, in turn, this generates an opposition between constitutionalism as a sponsor 
of negative freedom from governmental interference and constitutionalism as a vehicle for the pursuit of 
social rights and an expansive range of public goods. Yet while there is some  general affinity between 
autonomy and the individualism/universalism/plurality axis, and between equality and the 
collectivism/particularism/singularity axis, to the extent that these two concepts speak not only to the 
terms of political justice but also to distributive justice -  autonomy referring to  a specifically economic 
conception of freedom  from public interference and equality to equalization of allocation through public 
means, this describe a distinction which cuts across the fault line dividing populism from its ‘others’. 
That, indeed, is why, reflecting this divergence of economic philosophies, we find both Right and Left 
variants of contemporary populism; see Kaltwasser above, n14 
58 See e.g. CHARLES HOWARD McILWAIN, CONSTITTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (revd. 
ed 1947); Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ 25 OJLS 183(2005).  
Though this opposition also resonates, arguably more strongly, with the equality/autonomy 
distinction; see above n57.  
59 See e.g. SUJIT CHOUDHRY (ED) CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES; 
INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 




is between so-labelled liberal constitutionalism,61 with its preference for individual 
rights, judicial supremacy, constituted authority, iurisdictio and universal legal 
standards, and its various  terminological others, including ‘republican 
constitutionalism’,62 ‘political constitutionalism’63  and even popular constitutionalism 
itself. Here, as with the other oppositions, there is a tendency for advocates of each side 
to accuse the other side of imbalance and to seek redress.  And to the extent that 
populism has a preferred name for its constitutional ‘other’, it is certainly that of liberal 
constitutionalism.64   
3. Populist Constitutionalism Today 
But why now? If the seeds of populism are found in the deep subsoil of modern 
constitutionalism, why the contemporary flowering? The answer lies, at least in that 
part not attributable to conjunctural factors or leadership personalities, in the friction 
arising from the counterflow of two late modern trends. 
On the one hand, we live in an age in which global adherence to the democratic 
pedigree of constitutional arrangements becomes  more widespread and insistent. In the 
post-Second World War years, while there have been repeated waves and troughs of 
democratic initiative and consolidation, the overall tendency has been sharply towards 
the championing of democracy as a ‘universal commitment’65 and the normal template 
of government. Consistent with the underlying shift from a fate-centred to a choice-
centred social imaginary, the proto-democratic impulse in the original modernist 
                                                        
61 See e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007) 
62 See e.g. ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005) 
63 See e.g., Bellamy, above n61 
64  See e.g.  Muller, above n4; Blockker, ‘Populist Constitutionalism ‘above n16 
65  A. Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’ 10 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 3-17 (1999). In 1941 
only 13 countries could meet the most basic criteria of democratic self-government, but by the 
end of the century as many as 119 out of 192 countries could be described as electoral 
democracies – a figure that has stayed fairly constant since; see Freedom House Report, 





endorsement of constitutionalism as an act of collective self-authorship has matured 
into a more general attachment to democratic method in matters of governance.  Yet, 
crucially, while this mature pro-democratic orthodoxy generates the many participatory 
or deliberative innovations in constitutional architecture that go under the banner of 
popular constitutionalism,66 it also supplies an exacting critical standard against which 
the shortcomings of actually existing forms of government practice can be measured 
and highlighted.  
And it is in this gap that populism can prosper. As Jan-Werner Muller puts it, 
populism threatens to be ‘the permanent shadow of representative politics’ 67  – 
promising and promoting a severe reaction against all supposed compromises of 
democratic purity and distortions of the voice of ‘We, the People’.  It  offers a loud 
reminder that,  just through the established constitutional repertoire  of  mechanisms 
for the representation and distribution of power that give weight or protection to certain 
individual rights and group interests and seek to  provide a viable and accountable 
division of political and administrative labour in  a mass society, all  state authority 
systems are bound to be become somewhat attenuated from the  original or renewed 
constituent power of the unitary collective particular which is claimed to supply their 
democratic and cultural ‘prerequisite’.68  
On the other hand, this gap between constituent authority and constituted power, 
however unavoidable a feature of any project of democratic constitutionalism and 
                                                        
66  See e.g. A. Arato  POST SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION MAKING; LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY 
(2016) 
67 Muller, above n4 above, 101 
68 On the inability of liberal constitutionalism to guarantee its own prerequisites, see famously, the 
work of  Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde; in particular, ‘The Constituent Power of the People’ in 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: SELECTED WRITINGS (Mirjam Kunkler and Tina Stein, eds, 
Thomas Dunlap Trans) ch 7 (2017); see also, Martin Loughlin, ‘The Concept of Constituent Power’ 13 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL THEORY 218-237 (2014); PAUL KAHN, PUTTING 
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Constitutionalist Vulnerabilities to the populist conception of constituent power’ 19 GERMAN LAW 




however more vulnerable to critical exposure in an increasingly democratically 
conscious age, is also exacerbated by certain objectively democracy-challenging trends. 
Constitutional detachment from ‘the people’ can run in different directions, and today 
the range of these directions and the counter-attraction of these distancing forces, as 
well as the visibility of that distancing process of distancing, is increasing.  The two 
‘constitutive borders’ 69  of modern constitutional statehood have been somewhat  
eroded; those lying between the territorial inside and outside, and between the realm of 
general public power and private entitlement;  indeed, the underlying forces of 
transnationalism and privatization responsible for these erosions are often mutually 
reinforcing.  
And so the contemporary constitutional order becomes increasingly oriented 
towards the individual as an economic agent, or towards internal sub-national or other 
groups, or towards the ‘technocracy’70 of administrative expertise, or towards private 
transnational enterprises, or international legal and political entities –  all notable targets 
of populist ire. In these circumstances, populism is strengthened not only by its separate  
critique of these distancing factors, but also by the construction of narratives in which 
these alien forces are deemed to operate cumulatively and, under the supposed sign of 
the liberal establishment, even in combination against the unitary collective 
particular.71 
4. Conclusion 
                                                        
69 Grimm, above n54, 12  
70 See e.g. Christopher Bickerton & Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, ‘Populism and technocracy: opposites 
or complements?’ 20 CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 186-206 (2017) 
71  On the populist inclination towards conspiracy theories, see Bruno Catanho Silva, Federico Vegetti 
and Levente Littvay ‘The Elite Is Up to Something: Exploring the Relation Between Populism and 




Faced with these tendencies, we are left with two cautionary thoughts. First, a feature 
of the basic constitutional antinomies set out above is that their relationship is one of 
mutual support as much as mutual conflict or trade-off. Each is not only a challenge 
and corrective to the other, but also its precondition. Under the developed modern 
constitutional order collective and individual interests are mutually constitutive as 
much as mutually limiting, 72  so too are universal and particular rationalities and 
sensibilities, as are the conditions of constitutional singularity and plurality. Therefore, 
to criticize the other side for imbalance without being mindful of one’s own bias 
combines caricature with a lack of self-awareness, and with a failure to appreciate that  
all constitutional approaches founder if they do not respect constitutionalism’s 
precarious internal balance. It follows that populists can be rightly and emphatically 
criticized for a one-sidedness about the nature of constitutional well-being in their own 
critique of the one-sidedness of the ‘liberal establishment’. A strong intellectual case, 
then, can be made in critique of the contradictory impulses within the populist word-
view, and an insistent pressing of that case provides a key element of any constitutional 
and political argument against populism. 
Secondly, however, populism offers a standing reminder that, alongside  
criticism of the other side, the tension at the heart of modern constitutionalism must 
also be responded to in more constructive terms. That is so because the rise of populism 
reinforces the message that this tension, while ineradicable, is also treatable. On the one 
hand, the increased precariousness of the balancing act as the ‘two constitutive borders’ 
of state constitutionalism have become more porous under conditions of the 
transnationalisation and the fragmentation and privatization  of political authority will 
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inevitably draw renewed criticism from all who would attend to the claims of collective 
particularism. It will do so from those interested in the preservation, restoration or 
improvement of a plausible architecture of popular constitutionalism as much as from 
those impatient to impose more authoritarian solutions. The concerns from that side of 
the constitutional equation, therefore, can never be finally resolved, and ought never to 
be dismissed as passing or irrelevant by a myopic liberal constitutionalism.  But, on the 
other hand, the sheer intensity of the populist reaction provoked over recent years and 
the scale and resonance of its transnational dissemination is not inevitable. Rather, we 
should beware the fatalism - and irresponsibility – of an attitude that, making the 
opposite mistake to that of complacent dismissal, sees in  populist excess an elemental 
force beyond the influence of constitutional moderation. In the final analysis, any anti-
populist approach  needs to be informed by a recognition not only of the diverse roots 
and insistent nature of the perceptions of constitutional imbalance that fuel the 
discontents on which populism  feeds, but also  of the responsiveness of these 
perceptions to changes in the actual  conditions of governance.   
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